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CASENOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-RIGHT TO
COUNSEL IN STATE FELONY PROCEEDINGS
Petitioner, under a life sentence imposed by a state court,
brought a writ of habeas corpus alleging violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution in that while he was of unsound mind and unassisted
by counsel, he was tried and convicted of a charge carrying a
mandatory life sentence. The lower court dismissed the writ with-
out a hearing. Held: reversed, a hearing on the issue of insanity
was required. If the allegations were true, the failure to assign
counsel violated the Fourteenth Amendment since a trial which
left the defense to a man who was insane and who by reason of
his mental condition was unable to raise the insanity issue was
unfair.'
The accused in a federal felony proceeding is assured the
right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. 2 In state felony
proceedings, however, the Sixth Amendment is held inapplicable;
instead the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
controls.3 In interpreting the Due Process Clause, the Supreme
Court has required counsel only where the absence of counsel was
prejudicial to fundamental rights of the accused.4 In an attempt
to define this vague standard, the nine members of the Court
have frequently disagreed on what constitutes a prejudicial situa-
tion. The majority, following a case-by-case method of definition,
has established certain catagories of situations which are con-
sidered prejudicial if counsel is absent, e.g., where there is (1)
a young and inexperienced defendant; 5 (2) a mentally deficient
defendant;6 (3) a possibility of a death sentence ;7 (4) a defend-
iMassey v. Moore, 99 Sup. Ct. 117 (1955).
2 U.S. Const. Amend. VI; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
3 U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932)
as limited by Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). (Mr. Justice Black
dissented, Mr. Justice Douglas, and Mr. Justice Murphy concurring, on the
grounds that the Bill of Rights was incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment).
4 Ibid.
5Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948); Wade v. Mayo, 334
U.S. 672 (1948); De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 (1947). The
following cases involve factors of prejudice other than youth and in-
experience: Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134 (1951) (age and mental de-
ficiency); Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561 (1947) (age and nationality);
see Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (age and possibility of
death sentence).
6 Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134 (1951); see Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45, 71 (1932).
7 Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271 (1945) (by implication); Tomkins v.
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ant who is a stranger to our language and our courts;8 (5) de-
ception by the prosecution;9 (6) a biased or careless judge ;1° or
(7) complexity of issues.' A minority of the Court has constantly
argued that the lack of counsel in any felony proceeding is pre-
judicial to the fundamental rights of the accused. 12 The instant
case adheres to the majority's rationale and establishes yet an-
other situation in which the lack of counsel creates a potential
danger to the fundamental rights of the accused; viz, the possi-
bility of an insane defendant.'13
The vague standard of "prejudice" has resulted in such fine
legal distinctions as (1) prejudice being found to exist where a
defendant is faced with the possibility of a death sentence but is
actually sentenced to life imprisonment,'4 but not being found to
exist where the defendant faces and is sentenced to life imprison-
ment;1r, (2) prejudice being found where there is a mentally de-
ficient defendant, 16 but not being found to exist where there is
an uneducated defendant;17 or (3) prejudice being found to exist
where the trial judge misreads the accused's record of convic-
tions,' 8 but not being found to exist where a trial judge erroneously
interprets life imprisonment statutes. 19
These fine legal distinctions can be viewed as a conflict be-
tween the desire of the Court to insure uniformity in principles
Missouri, 323 U.S. 485 (1945); Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1945)
(by implication); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
s Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561 (1947).
9 Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (1941) (Nebraska case).
10Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773 (1949); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S.
736 (1948).
11 Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945) (Nebraska case); see De Meerleer
v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663, 665 (1947). But see Gayes v. New York, 332
U. S. 145, 148 (1947).
12See Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773, 782 (1949) (concurring opinion);
Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 677-679 (1948) (dissenting opinion); Foster
v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134, 139-145 (1947) (dissenting opinion); Carter v.
Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 180-187 (1946) (dissenting opinion).
13 Massey v. Moore, 99 Sup. Ct. 117 (1955).
14Tomkins v. Missouri, 323 U.S. 485 (1945).
15 Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948) (life sentence as a fourth of-
fender).
16 Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134 (1951).
171Hedgebeth v. North Carolina, 334 U.S. 806 (1948) (the Court af-
firmed 228 N.C. 259, 45 S.E.2d 563 in which lack of education was not
considered prejudicial).
'$Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
19 Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948).
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of liberty and justice20 and yet refrain from interfering with
state judicial proceedings.2 1 However, vagueness of definition has
invited appeal, and thus the state and federal courts have been
burdened with the administration of these appeals.22
The contention that counsel should be required in every state
felony proceeding has much merit. The confusion of a mentally
ill individual which was present in the instant case and which
was held to require the presence of counsel seems little different
from the confusion of a layman when faced with the complexities
of procedural issues. Nor does the difficulty inherent in federal
jurisdictional questions, where counsel has been required,23 seem
to differ from the difficulties encountered in other procedural
problems; viz, (1) determining the validity of the indictment ;21
(2) interpreting statutory and common law in order that the ap-
propriate defense may be selected;25 (3) determining the relev-
ancy or competency of evidence ;26 (4) preserving the record for
appeal; (5) determining whether continuances are necessary; and
(6) using cross-examination to refute the phenomena of a wit-
ness' selected memory. Since these possibilities do not always
appear in the record of the trial, in many instances it is impossible
for a reviewing court to determine whether the accused would
have fared better had there been counsel to point out the various
possible divergent procedural paths.27
It is submitted that while the Court in the instant case reached
the correct result, the decision should have been placed on the
ground that the absence of counsel in any state felony case is
always prejudicial to the fundamental rights of the accused.
Charles K. Thompson, '56
20 Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316-317 (1926).
21 Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134, 139 (1947).
22 Goodman, Use and Abuse of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 7 F.R.D. 313
(1948).
23 Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945).
2 4Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
25 See Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 475 (1945); cf. Glasser v.
United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75-76 (1942).
26 Cf. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
27 This is expressed well in Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76
(1942), "The right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental
and absolute to allow the courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the
amount of prejudice arising from its denial."
